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 While decentralization has long been considered an effective tool for improving service 
delivery, the theoretical benefits of this policy have not always materialized in practice. I aim to 
understand this gap between theory and practice by exploring the degree of human resource 
management (HRM) power possessed by district education officials in Malawi. I then consider 
how insufficient power may lead to struggles with accountability and service delivery. Through 
semi-structured interviews and a survey, I probe the experiences of district education officials, 
who are tasked with managing teachers within their district. I contextualize district officials’ 
perceptions of HRM power with interviews from key informants working in the central 
government. Through thematic analysis, I identify four moments in the HRM system where 
decision-making power is perceived to be essential: hiring, disciplining, dismissing, and 
promoting. I name these moments ‘Inflection Points for Better Service Delivery,’ and adapt 
Bossert’s (1998) “decision space” model as an analytical framework to assess whether officials 
have narrow, moderate, or wide decision-making power at each of these crucial moments. I 
conclude that participants largely perceive power at each inflection point to be insufficient for 
holding teachers accountable, which negatively impacts service delivery outputs in the 
classroom. Despite these challenges, however, I find that respondents are hopeful about the 
future of decentralization. While they acknowledge that the process is slow and that there are 
barriers to overcome, they are equally positive about achieving a future in which they might have 
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I. Introduction, Key Questions, and Significance 
 Policymakers have long viewed decentralization as a tool for improving service delivery; 
however, as governments across the world have implemented decentralization reforms in the past 
few decades, its promised effects have often not materialized. In the exploration of why 
decentralization fails in many contexts, I argue that it is necessary to view decentralization as an 
ongoing process of changing relationships, rather than a dichotomous policy shift from 
centralized to decentralized. Contextualizing decentralization this way, I examine the shift of 
human resource management (HRM) powers from central to district governments in Malawi’s 
education sector. I focus on how these shifts affect horizontal accountability, which is defined 
here as the accountability relationship between supervisory government officials and frontline 
workers. Throughout this thesis, I interrogate the ways that decentralizing HRM powers may 
affect this accountability relationship, challenging service delivery outputs in the education 
sector. 
 While many scholars have defined decentralization, there is no single, widely accepted 
definition (Mewes, 2011). Decentralization can be seen as a complex policy process (Falleti, 
2005) or more simply as the transference of power to more localized and autonomous levels of 
government (Rüland, 1993). For the purpose of this thesis, I derive my definition of 
decentralization from Rüland (1993), who describes decentralization as the transference of 
central power to autonomous local systems. Underlying the theory of decentralization is that the 
central government cannot efficiently meet the demands of a diverse constituency. By breaking a 
constituency into smaller, more homogenous groups and endowing local governments with 
political, financial, and/or administrative powers, it is theorized that decentralization will create a 
government system that is more responsive to citizen need (Oates, 1993; Tiebout, 1956).  
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 As local governments are given more power, accountability relationships also shift. 
These shifts are particularly present throughout the “long route of accountability,” which is 
comprised of the accountability relationship between citizens and the government as well as the 
accountability relationship between the government and frontline workers (World Bank, 2004). 
Decentralization changes these relationships by shifting the primary responder or actor in 
government from central to local. As decentralization progresses, citizens’ first stop for voicing 
their concerns and seeking redress when these concerns are not met should become the local 
government, rather than the central government. The accountability relationship between the 
government and frontline workers will also change, as the local government, rather than the 
central government, will be responsible for the actions of frontline workers.  
 The theorized effects of decentralization are both vast and diverse. Once decentralization 
is implemented, it should increase civic participation, facilitate confidence in the government, 
improve government responsiveness, and create policies based on local needs (Olum, 2014). In 
practice, there is some evidence that decentralization can improve participation in government 
(Bossert et al., 2003), reduce corruption (Fisman & Gatti, 2002), and redirect finances more 
efficiently (Faguet & Sánchez, 2008). Decentralization, however, has not always yielded such 
positive results, with some describing low teacher attendance (Leer, 2016), unchanged health 
outcomes (Bossert et al., 2003; De Geyndt, 2017), and reduced access to services (Ainuddin et 
al., 2013) following the implementation of decentralization policies. 
 When addressing this conflict, many scholars and policymakers have focused their efforts 
on studying and improving vertical accountability, the link between citizens and the government 
(World Bank, 2004). In developing countries, international organizations have supported several 
interventions meant to improve citizen involvement in government processes (Rodden & 
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Wibbels, 2019). Yet, scholars reviewing these interventions have found them largely ineffective 
when other supply-side factors, such as government capacity and the power to act on citizen 
demand, are lacking (Brinkerhoff & Wetterberg, 2016). 
 One particularly understudied supply-side factor in decentralization literature is 
horizontal accountability, the link between government officials and frontline workers (World 
Bank, 2004). I particularly focus on the hierarchal powers existing in this relationship, which 
theorize that the power to hire someone, and then punish or reward their behavior based on 
performance is key to maintaining a functioning bureaucracy (Weber et al., 2013). This theory is 
well supported, with systematic reviews of literature on the topic noting that management power 
and capabilities are important factors for organizing a government workforce (Berlan & 
Shiffman, 2012; Cleary et al., 2013). Some studies have aimed to connect HRM decision-making 
power to service delivery outcomes, finding that less power negatively impacts service delivery 
(Ghuman & Singh, 2013; Heywood & Harahap, 2009); however, these studies do not extensively 
consider the role of horizontal accountability in their assessments.   
 I contribute to this body of literature by assessing HRM powers in Malawi’s still 
decentralizing education sector and demonstrating how insufficient power leads to reduced 
horizontal accountability, ultimately affecting service delivery outputs. I adapt Bossert's (1998) 
“decision space” model to investigate HRM power at the district level. This model provides a 
framework for assessing the amount of decision-making power, or “decision space,” that exists 
formally, within legislation, or informally, in practice (Bossert, 1998). Through semi-structured 
interviews and a survey, I aim to assess district level perception of informal decision space at 
crucial moments in the HRM system. I interrogate how the degree of HRM power affects the 
accountability relationship between supervisory local government officials and frontline workers. 
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I argue that exploring informal decision space should be a fundamental precursor to making 
decisive statements about the effects of decentralization and suggest that examining this space is 
crucial for assessing the most useful policies to implement both in the short and long term.  
 Data collection for this thesis took place in Malawi. In 1998, Malawi passed the Local 
Government Act, widening districts’ formal decision space considerably. In the decades 
following this legislation, however, the central government has been slow to decentralize power 
(Chiweza, 2018). This lagging transference of power has been particularly pronounced with 
HRM powers (Kutengule et al., 2015). The incongruences that exist between formal decision 
space and informal decision space two decades after ratification of the Local Government Act 
make Malawi an interesting place to explore my research questions.  
 Chapter Two of this thesis will address the theoretical underpinnings of this study. I will 
explore definitions of decentralization, the theory behind how decentralizing power improves 
service delivery, and how decentralization changes the long route of accountability. Then, I will 
review studies addressing whether decentralization has been successful in improving service 
delivery, concluding that decentralization has not always produced the results that are theorized. 
This chapter will then turn to address the research and programs that focus on improving 
decentralization, noting that attention is primarily paid to demand-side factors, such as citizen 
engagement with the government. I will argue that greater focus needs to be placed on supply-
side factors, such as government power to hold frontline workers accountable, before justifying 
my contribution to this body of literature. I will end this chapter with some background on the 
decentralization process in Malawi, as well as a justification for choosing Malawi for this study. 
 Chapter Three will explain the methods used in this study. I will outline the process of 
data collection, discussing sampling strategy, tools for data collection, and ethical considerations 
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in the field. Then, I will describe the process of data analysis and explain my analytical 
framework, an adaptation of Bossert’s “decision space” model.  
 Chapter Four will describe the results of this study. I will provide a brief primer on the 
HRM system in Malawi at the time of data collection and name the four ‘inflection points’ to be 
discussed throughout this section. Then, I will detail each inflection point in the system, 
providing an assessment of the degree of perceived decision space that district respondents 
reported at each point. Analysis at each inflection point will also reflect on the way that limited 
power may restrict accountability and affect service delivery outputs. This chapter ends by 
discussing participants’ hopes for the future of decentralization.  
 Chapter Five concludes by summarizing the results and discussing potential limitations of 
the study. I explore what this thesis indicates about the future of decentralization and suggest 
some policy recommendations. Lastly, I note some avenues for further studies on 
decentralization, suggesting that academics should be careful to consider the degree of 




II. Background and Conceptual Framework 
Defining Decentralization: Policy, Process, and Types  
   While decentralization is generally considered to be a policy in which powers are 
transferred from the central government to local governments, there is no single, agreed upon 
definition of the term. Rüland (1993) defines decentralization as the transfer of decision-making 
power to local, autonomous levels of the government system, noting that the central government 
should only take on roles where local levels of government are incapable. In contrast, Falleti 
(2005) describes decentralization as a policy process by which decision-making authority is 
diffused from the central government to local governments across a country. While these two 
definitions restrict government decentralizing power to more local levels of government, 
Rondinelli's (1981) definition includes a more expansive group of actors to which power may be 
transferred, such as other branches of the central government, corporations, or nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs). For this thesis, I draw upon Rüland’s (1993) definition of 
decentralization, viewing it as a government policy where powers are transferred from a central 
level of government to an autonomous local level within the government system.  
 Generally, decentralization involves the transfer of one or more categories of power: 
political, fiscal, and/or administrative. Political decentralization involves the transfer of 
policymaking power to lower levels of government, increasing local government autonomy over 
policy initiatives within a district (Falleti, 2005). Fiscal decentralization involves the 
decentralization of financial and budgetary power to local levels of government (Work, 2002). 
Falleti (2005) defines powers in this category solely as the ability to generate revenue at the local 
level; however, definitions may also include increased revenue flow from central to local 
governments and greater local discretionary powers over use of funds (Mewes, 2011). 
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Administrative decentralization involves the transfer of bureaucratic management power, such as 
staff or supply chain delivery management, to local governments (Falleti, 2005).  
 Political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization do not have to, and often do not, 
occur simultaneously, leaving some responsibilities centralized while others move to local 
government control (Falleti, 2005). In addition, the ability to carry out decentralized powers in 
one area may require powers in another area to be decentralized (Falleti, 2005). For example, the 
ability to manage administration within a district will require fiscal resources. If fiscal power is 
limited, either in terms of collecting or using resources, administrative functions at the local level 
will suffer.  
 Although functionally these powers cannot easily be separated from one another, this 
thesis primarily focuses on the decentralization of administrative power. There are three forms of 
administrative decentralization: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. Deconcentration, 
both the most common and most limited type of administrative decentralization, disperses 
ministry representatives to local governments, making them responsible for managing employees 
within their sector (Rondinelli & Minis, 1990; Silverman, 1992). Under this form of 
administrative decentralization, the central government still holds primary authority and local 
governments gain little decision-making power (Silvermam, 1992). Delegation refers to the 
decentralization of administrative powers to local governments or private entities through 
contractual agreements (Schneider, 2003). The last form is devolution, considered to be the 
strongest form of administrative decentralization (Shah & Thompson, 2004). Under 
administrative devolution, local government becomes mostly autonomous, with full decision-
making authority over administrative powers (Silverman, 1992). While these categories may be 
helpful in the theoretical examination of decentralization, I argue that they are overly prescriptive 
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when applied to contexts where decentralization is actively occurring. For example, it becomes 
unclear how to classify a government system that has legislation describing devolution, but is 
functioning close to the definition of deconcentration.     
 Departing from these structured forms of decentralization, Bossert (1998) creates a model 
of power assessment that can inspect both formal and informal decision space. Formal decision 
space is the range of decision-making power granted to local governments by legislation or 
policy (Bossert, 1998). On the other hand, informal decision space is the range of decision-
making power that local governments actively possess and can use (Bossert, 1998). Decision 
space, whether formal or informal, is considered narrow if local officials have many restrictions 
placed on decision-making authority, moderate if local officials have some restrictions placed on 
decision-making authority, and wide if local officials have limited restrictions placed on 
decision-making authority (Bossert, 2016). Throughout this thesis, I do not refer to the three 
structured forms of administrative decentralization, deconcentration, delegation, and devolution, 
preferring the flexibility of the “decision space” model to understand the types of administrative 
powers conferred to local governments in different districts as decentralization continues.  
Theories of Decentralization, Accountability, and Service Delivery 
 Decentralization is theorized as a way to solve the central government’s inability to meet 
the demands of an often heterogeneous constituency, empowering local governments to react 
more efficiently to a group of citizens that share similar needs (Oates, 1973; Tiebout, 1956). Fuhr 
(1999) theorizes that decentralization improves service delivery because citizens, the customers 
for public goods provision, are closer to government decision-makers, the providers of public 
goods. The envisioned benefits of decentralization are vast, ranging from increased citizen 
participation in government processes (Bossert et al., 2003) to better management of government 
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employees (Kolehmainen-Aitken, 1998). With regards to service delivery, decentralization is 
intended to move services closer to citizens, improving the system’s efficiency and increasing 
service access (Regmi, 2014).  















 Central to the theorized benefits of decentralization are the accountability relationships 
between citizens and the government and between the government and frontline workers. These 
two relationships form the “long route of accountability” (World Bank, 2004). The first 
accountability link in the long route of accountability is vertical accountability, the relationship 
between citizens and the government (World Bank, 2004). This link requires that citizens have 
information about government officials’ actions, a forum for government officials to explain 
their actions, and some sort of mechanism by which citizens can seek redress (Schedler, 1999). 
The second accountability link is horizontal accountability, the relationship between government 
officials and frontline workers (World Bank, 2004). In this thesis, I particularly focus on the 
hierarchal accountability powers that exist within the horizontal accountability relationship, 
focusing on the downward relationship between government officials and front-line workers in 
communities. The underlying theory of hierarchical power in bureaucracies is that an employee 
is hired to work a specific function within an organization in return for wages and may lose this 
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position should he not fulfill this function (Weber et al., 2013). Equally, the employee should 
have opportunities to move up from lower-level jobs to higher-level jobs based on achievement 
and merit, as such incentives serve as a way to keep officials motivated and better the 
functioning of the bureaucracy (Weber et al., 2013). Thus, the ability to punish officials working 
against the organization’s initiatives and reward officials working towards the organization’s 
initiatives is vital in creating a bureaucratic system that works efficiently.  











 Where accountability links are strong in the long route of accountability, the system 
should work as follows: citizens will voice demands to the government; the government will be 
accountable for meeting those demands; the government will instruct frontline workers to change 
																																																								
1 This figure is not inclusive of all accountability links. Although not shown, I recognize that under a decentralized 
democratic system, citizens would still possess the ability to electorally hold the central government accountable. I 
also recognize that the central government will maintain some role in holding frontline workers accountable. The 
intricacies of these theories are beyond the scope of my thesis, and this figure is simply meant to demonstrate how 
decentralization may generally change accountability relationships as another layer of government is given greater 
authority.  
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their behavior in response to those demands; and frontline workers will accountable for changing 
their behavior in line with government instruction (see Figure 1). Decentralization changes both 
of these links of accountability by shifting the first-level government actor from the central to the 
district level (see Figure 2). Following the transfer of decision-making authority, the district 
government becomes the first responder for citizen need. The district government will also, 
depending on the type of decentralization, serve as the first line of direction and management for 
frontline workers.  
 While in theory decentralization and its effects on the long route of accountability should 
provoke positive outcomes, there is evidence to suggest that in some cases, decentralization has 
either not improved service delivery or has made it worse. The decentralization of government 
disaster management in Pakistan left many citizens more susceptible to disasters and unable to 
access government services (Ainuddin et al., 2013). In Indonesia, teacher attendance in 
classrooms plummeted following the implementation of decentralization reforms (Leer, 2016). 
Health outcomes stayed largely the same following the implementation of decentralization 
policies in Zambia (Bossert et al., 2003). Similarly, in a study covering five countries’ 
experiences with decentralization, De Geyndt (2017) finds that policies increasing hospital 
autonomy do not necessarily improve performance. These studies demonstrate that the effects of 
decentralization do not always materialize as they are theorized.  
 In an attempt to uncover why decentralization reforms are unsuccessful in many contexts, 
many scholars and practitioners have turned their attention to examining the ways that 
decentralization affects vertical accountability. While theorized to improve this accountability 
link, decentralization has not always been shown to increase citizen participation, a key 
component of vertical accountability. Muriu (2013) finds that decentralization has not improved 
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citizen participation in local government planning and budgeting. Similarly, in a study reviewing 
decentralization in Uganda, Kakumba (2010) finds that citizen participation in local government 
processes has been limited, emphasizing that it has not improved links of accountability. In an 
attempt to improve citizen participation, many international organizations have initiated projects 
aimed at engaging citizens with the government, with a focus on publicizing public official’s 
actions or increasing citizen participation in local government decision-making processes 
(Rodden & Wibbels, 2019).  
 However, review articles on these types of interventions highlight that they often lack 
effectiveness in improving service delivery. Brinkerhoff and Wetterberg (2016) find that citizen-
based accountability mechanisms were most effective when factors for supply and demand were 
equally strong. Where there was limited local government action, they found that projects 
increasing citizens’ involvement in government processes had little effect on service delivery 
outcomes. Fox (2015) finds evidence of a similar phenomenon in his review, claiming that the 
whole system of accountability is weakened when one accountability link is broken. When the 
government does not have the power to hold frontline workers accountable, the government’s 
ability to be accountable to citizens will suffer. While much attention has been paid to improving 
citizens’ engagement in government, it is clear that understanding supply-side factors and a local 
government’s ability to act on citizen needs demands equal consideration. 
 Where local government decision-making power, or capacity to use that power, is 
limited, there is evidence that service delivery challenges will arise. Ghuman and Singh (2013) 
find that restricting district financial or HRM autonomy creates unfavorable conditions for 
efficient service delivery in a decentralized system. Similarly, as HRM decision space decreased 
in Indonesia’s health system, district officials lost incentives to use management resources 
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efficiently (Heywood & Harahap, 2009). These studies review the HRM system but do not 
consider the role of lost accountability as a mediator between limited decision-making power and 
service delivery. Other studies have focused on particular moments in the HRM system. For 
example, Munga et al. (2009) find that while it is harder to hire qualified health workers under 
decentralized recruitment, retention of health workers is improved; however, they do not directly 
address the impact of local recruitment on accountability in this discussion.  
 I aim to expand upon these works by studying the entire HRM system, from a frontline 
worker’s entry to their exit, as well as the links between inadequate decision space, 
accountability, and service delivery. I use Bossert’s (1998) “decision space” model as an 
analytical framework to determine whether HRM decision-making powers are narrow, moderate, 
or wide at four critical moments in the HRM system. I argue that insufficient power at these 
moments affects the ability for local government officials to hold frontline workers in their 
districts accountable. Ultimately, I suggest that this lack of accountability causes service delivery 
outputs, such as attendance of teachers and teaching quality, to suffer.  
Decentralization in Malawi  
 This thesis focuses on the decentralization of HRM powers in Malawi. In order to 
understand decentralization in Malawi’s current context, it is necessary to review Malawi’s 
history and relationship with devolved power. From 1891 to 1963, during the colonial period in 
Malawi, the British administration gave local governments the powers to police and collect 
taxes, establishing a system of indirect rule (Chiweza, 1998). Following independence, Malawi 
entered a period of single party rule from 1964 to 1994. In an attempt to centralize powers, 
district councils were stripped of their authority and the central government took responsibility 
for sectors that had once been managed by chiefs and local actors (Dulani, 2004). As Malawi 
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emerged as a multi-party democracy in 1994, the new constitution placed an emphasis on the 
decentralization of administrative and political powers to local governments (Dulani, 2004).  
 It is under this context that the Government of Malawi passed the Local Government Act 
in 1998, instructing the formal decentralization of powers to districts across the country. The 
Local Government Act describes better service delivery, increased democracy, and improved 
governance as their primary goals for decentralization (Government of Malawi, 1998). Despite 
passing decentralization legislation over two decades ago, the active decentralization of powers 
from the central government to districts has lagged. Kutengule et al. (2015) remark that delayed 
decentralization is particularly prominent with HRM powers, noting that decentralization 
legislation gave government ministries some flexibility to decide which powers they would 
endow to district governments. As a result, the central government has clung to many 
administrative powers, leaving a gap between decentralization policy and decentralization in 
reality. I chose Malawi for this study due to its experience with decentralizing. The 
incongruences between formal decision space and informal decision space combined with a 
prolonged and ongoing period of decentralization means that many of the conflicts produced by 
insufficient informal decision space can be readily observed.  
 For the purposes of this study, I primarily focus on decentralization within the education 
sector. Although it was one of the first sectors to decentralize, the process of devolving powers 
has stretched out across decades. The Ministry of Education was expected to produce legislation 
that outlined the district government’s powers and responsibilities in a decentralized system soon 
after the Local Government Act was passed; however, they failed to provide this direction, 
leaving powers largely centralized for years following the formal establishment of 
decentralization policy (Davies et al., 2003). While in more recent years pushes to devolve 
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power make the education sector one of the most decentralized in Malawi (Chiwesa, 2018), 
much of the centralized structure remains.  
 At the time of data collection for this study, HRM powers possessed by the district 
government only applied to primary education teachers, while the central government retained 
all power over aspects of the secondary education system. This thesis aims to address the 
decentralization process and as such does not address the secondary education system, for which 
much of this process had not begun at the time of data collection.2 It is for these characteristics 
that I chose the education sector to conduct this research. Since it is considered the most 
decentralized, the effects of increased decision space should be most solidified within this sector, 
making them ripe to capture. 
 Even with some HRM powers decentralized to district governments, it is often not 
enough, leaving local governments unable to resolve issues at the district level. Within the 
education sector, this phenomenon has been noted extensively. Chimombo (2008) finds that a 
lack of control over recruitment has affected the ability for district education officials to manage 
teachers. Similarly, Kufaine (2008) provides evidence that district officials have limited power 
over teacher recruitment, making a link between these powers and limited accountability to 
citizens. Thomas (2017) emphasizes this point, noting that the decentralization of this power 
could improve teacher management; however, neither Thomas (2017) nor Kufaine (2008) 
explore HRM powers beyond recruitment nor do they elaborate on the link between HRM 
powers, accountability, and service delivery. My thesis aims to expand upon the observations of 
these scholars by interrogating the challenges expressed by district education officials managing 
teachers in their districts with limited HRM powers.  
																																																								




Data Collection Methods 
Participant Cohorts and Subcategories 
 Data for this thesis came from an exploratory study on decentralization conducted 
between June and August 2019. The focus of this thesis narrowed during data analysis and as 
such, I do not address all of the data from this exploratory study. Participants selected for 
analysis in this thesis spoke at length about HRM powers in the education sector during 
interviews. These participants included those working at the central level, in a variety of 
ministries and agencies, as well as those working at the district level under the Ministry of 
Education (see Table 1). For the purposes of this study, I include all central participants in one 
cohort together. I do this in order to protect the anonymity of the participants who worked at 
smaller central level agencies. Interviews from this cohort are not meant to be representative of 
the experience of central government or a particular sector and have only been used to 
contextualize the analysis of district participants.    
 
Table 1: Data Included in Analysis for This Thesis 







Total 19 13 
*In one case a participant asked that his colleague join the interview. I enrolled this colleague as a participant, and 
he participated in the interview and filled out a survey. In analysis, his responses were considered individually 




 Central Government Respondents: 
 Participants from this cohort were purposively selected based on their positions in 
particular ministries and departments. In some cases, following the interview, participants would 
refer me to colleagues, creating an opportunity to collect more data through snowball sampling.   
 District Education Respondents: 
 District selection for participant recruitment in this cohort was decided based on data 
provided by the Ministry of Education. I aimed to interview district government officials 
representing districts with varied levels of citizen demand for education and available resources. 
Demand was determined based on average student-teacher ratios in public primary schools in a 
district. Resource availability was determined using two indicators. The first indicator was 
student-teacher ratio, representing a measure of resources that, with a few exceptions, go without 
funding or monitoring by donors. The second indicator was textbook-student ratio. While many 
textbooks are government funded, they also are a popular item for donors to contribute to 
schools. The two measures of resource availability were often highly correlated, but where they 
differed, student-teacher ratio was prioritized in decision-making. Using this data, I purposively 
selected districts from all three regions of Malawi that had a mix of low, moderate, and high 
demand and resource indicators.  
 The intention of this sampling strategy was to understand how district officials’ 
experiences with decentralization might differ given the conditions of the district that they work 
in; however, during data collection many participants mentioned that they had moved to the 
district recently or had worked in many different districts throughout their career. While 
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interviews in some cases focused on the district where the participant currently worked, 
experiences relayed in interviews often traversed the respondents’ career across many districts. 
Thus, the unexpectedly high frequency of civil servant transfers rendered this sampling strategy 
largely irrelevant. In analysis, I do not claim these officials to be representative of certain 
districts nor do I conduct analysis along the lines of district characteristics.  
Tools for Data Collection 
 Semi-Structured Interviews 
 The aim of this project was to collect in-depth experiences of civil servants in 
administrative roles operating in a decentralizing system. In order to capture the necessary detail 
to achieve this goal, I chose semi-structured interviews as the primary method of data collection. 
Interview protocols differed slightly depending on whether the participant worked at the district 
or central level; however, all protocols probed the same six topics: financial autonomy, human 
resource autonomy, challenges, successes, donor involvement, and hopes for the future (see 
Appendices 1 and 2 for interview protocols). The semi-structured nature of the interview also 
gave participants some agency to guide the conversation within these topic areas. This was an 
important methodological choice given the project’s goal to emphasize civil servants’ 
experiences, and it allowed conversations to be as wide ranging or narrow as the participant felt 
comfortable.  
 Likert Scale Survey 
 At the end of the interview, participants who worked in the education sector were asked 
to fill out a short survey (see Appendix 3). This project primarily focused on powers specific to 
the education sector. The survey reflected this, probing participants with statements related to 
education management. As such, participants from outside this sector were not administered the 
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survey. This survey echoed the same six topics discussed in the interview, using a Likert Scale to 
provide a numerical assessment of perceptions of HRM powers and service delivery. I aimed for 
this survey to provide a check on the validity of the data collected from interviews; however, 
results from the survey should not be overstated for two reasons. Resources and time constraints 
did not allow me to conduct a pre-test on the survey before administering it. As such, phrasing 
and words may not have been the most clear or precise. Second, the survey was not translated 
into Chichewa, the local language in Malawi. While all the officials I spoke with were proficient 
English speakers, providing the survey in Chichewa may also have made the results more 
reliable. Results from the survey should be considered with these limitations in mind.  
Data Collection 
 Data for this study were collected between June and August 2019 in Malawi. I started by 
interviewing participants in the central government, familiarizing officials with the project and 
achieving gatekeeper permission to interview district officials. Interviewing central government 
officials first also provided crucial background information that made probing district officials 
more effective. Having reached saturation at the central level, I traveled to numerous districts to 
interview district participants. At the conclusion of these district interviews, I conducted one 
more round of interviews with those at the central level to fill any remaining gaps in knowedge.  
Data Collection Ethics  
 This research study received an exemption from the Institutional Review Board at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (19-0995) as well as an approval from the National 
Committee for Science and Technology in Malawi (NCST/RTT/2/6). Participants were given the 
option to choose the locale for the interviews, which often took place in private office spaces. 
Before the interview began participants were given an information sheet on the study and had 
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time to ask questions before verbal consent was obtained. Some participants asked for this 
information sheet and the interview protocol ahead of the interview, and this request was always 
granted. After consent to conduct the interview was obtained, additional verbal consent to record 
the interview was obtained as well. At any point in the interview, participants had the option to 
request that the recorder be turned off. Where a survey was administered, participants were given 
an envelope to seal the survey in, giving them an anonymous option to turn the survey in blank 
should they no longer want to complete it at any point. The envelope also served to protect their 
answers, though no identifiable information was probed for.    
Data Analysis Methods 
Selection of Data for Analysis 
 The purpose of this thesis is to explore the granular processes of managing front-line 
service deliverers. In order to fulfill this purpose and speak to an open gap in decentralization 
literature, I primarily focus my analysis in this thesis on the interviews conducted with 
participants working in district education offices. Participants selected from the central 
government are used throughout this thesis to contextualize the analyses of district interviews.  
Qualitative Analysis 
 I started qualitative analysis with district education respondents’ interviews. As with most 
qualitative data analysis, the coding process required multiple rounds. The initial round of 
qualitative analysis involved flagging wide thematic categories in the data. Themes that arose 
from this initial coding included ‘human resources,’ ‘finance,’ ‘background,’ ‘success,’ 
‘challenge,’ and ‘moving forward.’ These broad themes aligned with the interview protocol; 
however, blocks of transcript relating to human resources were the most common category to 
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arise from this initial process. While HRM cannot be separated from the rest of the 
decentralization process, I made the decision to focus deeper analysis on these aspects of the 
conversation.  
 A closer analysis of text coded under ‘human resources’ revealed five HRM categories 
that were widely discussed: hire, monitor, discipline, dismiss, promote. Using line-by-line free 
coding, I expanded analysis around each of these actions, parsing out the powers that district 
education officials reported as well as exploring the implications of decision-making space at 
each of these moments.  
 Central government respondents’ interviews were coded using a loosely similar scheme. 
Because these interviews were primarily for the purposes of contextualizing district education 
data, I did not apply the analytical framework discussed below in my analysis of central 
government interviews.  
Analytical Framework 
 In order to systematically assess experiences of decision-making in the HRM system, I 
adapted Bossert’s “decision space” model as an analytical framework to assess district level 
education participants’ responses. Bossert’s (1998) “decision space” model aims to assess both 
the formal, as written by law, and informal, as practiced by local governments, decision-making 
powers, organizing decision space into three categories: narrow, moderate, and wide. Using 
Bossert’s broad definitions of these categories as guidelines, I created parameters for narrow, 
moderate, and wide decision space for each HRM action highlighted in analysis (See Table 2 







Table 2: Application of Bossert’s Framework to Inflection Points for Better Service 
Delivery 
 Narrow Moderate Wide 
Hiring District officials cannot 
advertise open teaching 
positions or hire teachers.  
District officials can 
advertise open teacher 
positions and hire teachers 
without central approval 
under certain conditions. 
District officials can hire 
their own teachers without 
central approval. 
Disciplining District officials cannot 
take disciplinary action 
without central approval. 
District officials can take 
disciplinary action without 
central approval up to a 
certain employment grade. 
District officials can 
discipline all teachers at all 
employment grades 
without central approval. 
Dismissing District officials cannot 
dismiss teachers without 
central approval. 
District officials can dismiss 
teachers up to a certain 
employment grade without 
central approval. 
District officials can 
dismiss all teachers at all 
employment grades 
without central approval.  
Promoting District officials cannot 
promote teachers without 
central approval. 
District officials can 
promote teachers without 
central approval up to a 
certain employment grade.  
District officials can 
promote all teachers at all 
employment grades 





Malawi’s Human Resource Management System in 2019 
 In 2019, at the time of data collection for this project, decentralization of HRM powers in 
the education sector was ongoing. Central government participants outlined a system in which 
the power to hire, discipline, dismiss, and promote primary education teachers had been broadly 
transferred from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Local Government. At the central 
level, the Local Government Service Commission, rather than the Teaching Service 
Commission, was now responsible for overseeing these HRM processes. Throughout interviews 
at the district level, however, it became clear that this shift was not widely understood. 
Respondents often reported feeling tied to both the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Local 
Government, and district education respondents’ responses to questions on the pathways of this 
system often varied. Furthermore, there was no single piece of legislation that described the 
developing decentralized system. While the Local Government Act loosely explains the 
decentralization of power, central government respondents explained that the Education Act and 
Health Services Commission Act directly contradicted the decentralized structure outlined in the 
Local Government Act. In interviews, this contradiction was discussed as causing both confusion 
and court cases.  
 As such, it became clear throughout my research that I was not in a position to try to 
describe the bureaucratic structures of this system because it was still developing. As a result, I 
do not attempt to describe with accuracy the exact bureaucratic pathways within the HRM 
system. Instead, I talk about the perception of informal decision space at this time, analyzing 
how decision-making power is perceived in the midst of changing bureaucratic structures. 
Quotes from respondents should be seen as perceptions of power within these changing 
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structures, not as definitive descriptions of the HRM system. By emphasizing the experience of 
district officials, I believe that I have captured an understanding of what it looks like to manage 
staff in a decentralizing system, but the question of formal decision space in the HRM system in 
Malawi is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Inflection Points for Better Service Delivery 
 Analysis of district education officials’ interviews revealed four moments within the 
course of a teacher’s career where district HRM power was particularly crucial for improving 
education service delivery outputs, such as teacher behavior and attendance in classrooms.1 I’ve 
named these moments ‘Inflection Points for Better Service Delivery’ and define them as 
moments in the HRM system where the government supervisor (central or district) has direct 
power over the employment trajectory of the frontline worker (teacher). At each of these 
inflection points, the ability for district officials to respond quickly to constituents’ needs and 
complaints is crucial for delivering services. Without that ability, my data suggests education 
services will suffer.  
 The four inflection points included in this analysis are hiring, disciplining, dismissing, 
and promoting (see Figure 3). The inflection points combine to create the broad system of human 
resources in which a teacher’s career trajectory exists. Notably, this system functions fairly 
linearly, with each inflection point building on the previous one. Where insufficient power exists 
at inflection points early in the system, the ability to act later in the system to correct or reward 
behavior diminishes.  
 I have also included monitoring as a precondition to Inflection Points 2, 3, and 4. The 
power to monitor is distinct from the inflection points in that it is an indirect or facilitating 
																																																								
1 While this thesis does not comment on service delivery outcomes, such as test scores or student graduation rates, I 
argue that the teaching outputs discussed are necessary precursors to achieving the desired education outcomes. 
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power. While inflection points are moments where supervisors can act directly on behavior by 
employing, punishing, or rewarding frontline workers, monitoring captures the behavior of 
frontline workers without a corresponding supervisor power. Monitoring without the inflection 
points would likely not create larger ripples in a teacher’s employment trajectory; however, 
without monitoring, correcting or rewarding behavior at Inflection Points 2, 3, and 4 would not 
be possible. Participants brought up challenges relating to monitoring often enough that it 
became necessary to address this precondition and the way it relates to other inflection points in 
the HRM system.  
 


















 In this chapter, I will use my adaptation of Bossert’s “decision space” model to analyze 
district participants’ perceptions of their power at each of these inflection points. I will then 
discuss the ways that decision space within the HRM system challenges horizontal 
accountability, ultimately detracting from service delivery outputs. Particularly, I will connect 
decision space at these inflection points to teacher attendance in rural classrooms, a service 
delivery output raised by 69% of respondents (9/13) as a major challenge. While respondents 
Inflection Point 1: 
Hiring 
Inflection Point 2: 
Disciplining 




Inflection Point 4: 
Promoting 
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stressed that teaching in rural areas came with unique challenges, many were equally frustrated 
with their inability to keep teachers in the schools that were most in need. This challenge 
represents a case where increased decision space at inflection points may give district education 
officials the ability to hold teachers accountable, improving service delivery for students.  
Inflection Point 1: Hiring 
 The first inflection point exists at the moment when a teacher is hired. I find that 92% of 
participants (12/13) reported that they had narrow decision space at this inflection point (see 
Table 3), describing a process in which the central government selects recently graduated 
teachers to hire and provides a list of names to districts for school allocation: 
“…normally training of teachers is done by Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of 
Education, they send these teachers to districts for deployment…now these days it’s done 
through Local Government Service Committee, LASCOM. Now, it’s up to the District 
Education Manager now to distribute teachers, to where there is need. And after that, 
you report to the council. And whenever doing that we follow what we call PTR [Pupil 
Teacher Ratio]. Normally, according to government, a school, a classroom is supposed 
to have 60 learners being taught by one teacher… Now, if a school has a higher PTR, for 
example, 100, then you have to send teachers there.” (District Education Respondent) 
 Under this system, district education offices will report their average PTR to the central 
government once a year. The target PTR was sixty students to one teacher at the time of data 
collection in 2019. Districts where the average ratio is greater than sixty students to one teacher 
should receive a list of new teachers every year from the central government. While the number 
of teachers sent from the central government may not necessarily level the PTR in a district to 
the desired 60:1, it should improve each district’s ratio. The primary power of the district 
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education office is to take this list of teachers and distribute them to schools where there is most 
need, as determined by PTR at the school level.  
 While most participants reported narrow decision space, one participant met the threshold 
for moderate “decision space,” reporting the ability to locally advertise and hire to replace a 
teacher who may have died or retired; however, this respondent noted an inability to create new 
positions and hire locally for those. In this way, the respondent described some power to hire for 
positions already in existence but could not expand the number of teachers in his district in order 
to affect PTR. Despite moderate “decision space,” this participant noted that the majority of new 
hires still were assigned by the central government instead of being locally hired. 
 Table 3: District Education Perception of “Decisions Space” at Inflection Point 1 – Hiring 
 
 Results from the survey showed that many participants did not believe that they had 
sufficient power to hire. Fifty-four percent of participants (7/13) disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with the statement “My office has sufficient authority to hire primary school teachers.” Of the 
four participants who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, two mentioned in interviews 
that there were significant challenges brought by a lack of hiring power. For the aforementioned 
 Hiring decision space Sufficient Hiring Power? 
DE Participant 1 Moderate Strongly Disagree 
DE Participant 2 Narrow Neutral 
DE Participant 3 Narrow Disagree 
DE Participant 4 Narrow Disagree 
DE Participant 5 Narrow Agree 
DE Participant 6 Narrow Strongly Disagree 
DE Participant 7 Narrow Strongly Agree 
DE Participant 8 Narrow Strongly Disagree 
DE Participant 9 Narrow Strongly Agree 
DE Participant 10 Narrow Agree 
DE Participant 11 Narrow Strongly Disagree 
DE Participant 12 Narrow Neutral 
DE Participant 13 Narrow Disagree 
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methodological reasons, survey results should not be over-interpreted; however, this discrepancy 
could also indicate that the perception of “enough power” may not align with the challenges that 
arise from limited ability to act and may be an interesting point for further study. 
 Narrow hiring powers at Inflection Point 1 pose significant challenges for district 
officials who are trying to increase the number of teachers in their rural schools. Teachers sent 
from the central government may not be from the district that they are assigned and thus, may 
not have a home in the area. As a result, teachers will have to find accommodation, which 
respondents stressed could be particularly difficult in more rural areas. Teachers who are unable 
to find housing or who struggle with rural accommodations may try to contest their employment 
at a school, asking district officials for reassignment.  
 Where district officials decline to reassign teachers, they may appeal to the central 
government. One participant mentioning this phenomenon explained that, 
“…sometimes they will go to central government [and say] “where you have sent us, I’m 
not happy, I’m not happy.” Then, [if] the secretary favorite[s] him, we just [hear] that 
the government officer is not coming. So possibly they are having been allocated to other 
districts. That’s the thinking. We don’t have the evidence, but one has been coming, 
complaining so much, complaining so much, and he, the reasons which… she or he has 
been putting forwards were not convincing to me so that I couldn’t change my mind to 
change the school, then if he stops coming then he or she has gone there and they are 
considering him or her [for another district].” (District Education Respondent) 
 Because the central government hired them, teachers may not see the district education 
office as the final authority for their assignment. Narrow district hiring powers impact the 
relationship between teachers and district education officials by creating the impression that the 
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central government holds ultimate power. Particularly when the central government acts on an 
appeal from a teacher, the already limited authority of district officials within the hiring process 
is further undermined.  
 This perceived authority permeates into the rest of the HRM system. Hiring was often 
discussed in interviews as the moment that defined the relationship between district education 
offices and the teachers they manage, with one respondent saying the following: 
“…when you hire somebody you also have the right to fire. You see that? And that makes 
control of staff easier because they know this guy hired me, he is also going to fire me. 
But here, they are hired by somebody else, they are also fired by somebody else. We are 
supposed to manage them. When something happens, you can only refer to somebody 
else.” (District Education Respondent) 
 This respondent indicates that narrow decision space in hiring may impact later inflection 
points, such as the power to discipline and dismiss. Even if these other powers shift to district 
councils, the impression that the central government holds ultimate power across all inflection 
points may remain as long as the central government initiates hiring. Thus, having decision space 
at this inflection point is crucial in setting up the rest of the HRM system for success. 
 Ultimately, insufficient hiring authority had implications for service delivery outputs, 
reducing the district official’s ability to assign teachers to rural classrooms and maintain them 
there, with one participant saying, 
“And sometimes it becomes very, very difficult to send them to the schools because some 
of the schools have got more challenges than others. Maybe no accommodation, no 
markets, nothing. So teachers come back and complain to say we can’t go to such and 
such school because of this element. So, had it been recruitment and even deployment 
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was done per school, say we want teachers for this school and people apply for the 
position at that school. We won’t have challenge to say ‘no I can’t go and teach [at that] 
school, give me another better school.’” (District Education Respondent) 
 When teachers complain about rural assignments, the district education officials can 
either reassign the teacher or send them back to their assigned school. Either way, the teacher’s 
complaint must be investigated and addressed, often taking up a considerable amount of time. By 
hiring locally, this respondent suggests that he could keep more teachers in rural areas without as 
many complaints, as candidates for the position will be aware of the conditions before agreeing 
to work there. Further, a district level employment contract could be linked to a particular school, 
making it easier to terminate the teacher if he or she no longer wished to work in a rural area. 
Increasing power at Inflection Point 1 could give district education officials greater final 
authority, not only in hiring candidates that they believe will stay in rural areas, but also in 
exercising power at later points in the HRM system.  
A Precondition to Inflection Points 2, 3, and 4: Monitoring 
 Following teachers’ employment, officials at district offices are responsible for 
monitoring their performance. There are both school and district level structures to provide 
performance feedback. While interviews did not delve into these structures in depth, an 
important trend around monitoring emerged. Primary Education Advisors (PEAs) are key actors 
in collecting and confirming reports at the school level and bringing them to the district office. 
Throughout interviews, however, it became clear that many PEAs did not have the resources to 
maximize the potential of their role. Particularly, respondents noted that strained resources and 
limited financial power prevented them from obtaining more motorcycles, which directly 
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affected PEAs ability to monitor. One participant described this relationship by saying the 
following: 
“…we don’t have any available vehicle[s]. How do you supervise? How do you monitor 
the activities of the education? Not only that. Currently, I have already mentioned to say 
teachers are pressed in zones. Many schools, teachers belong to many schools. They have 
to have one supervisor who is written as the Primary Education Advisor. Those ones, 
they don’t have motorcycles. How do they move to schools and supervise the teachers 
because those are supposed to go into the classroom setting and see how the teacher is 
delivering.	Where things are not going well, they’re supposed to organize a continuous 
professional development meeting that level. Teachers are meant to sit at that level. So 
mobility is again another challenge. ” (District Education Respondent) 
 Without the motorcycles, district officials lose their ability to know how a teacher is 
delivering services. When resources obstruct the ability to monitor, service delivery issues 
remain unknown, and corrective action, such as the professional development meetings 
mentioned by this participant or more extensive disciplinary powers, cannot take place. Thus, the 
ability to attain information about teacher performance in schools is an important precondition 
for any action that aims to correct or reward behavior. This example serves as a reminder that 
HRM challenges cannot be separated from financial challenges. While technically districts have 
wide power to monitor school zones, narrow financial powers limits this ability. Ultimately, this 
affects all of the inflection points that follow hiring, as issues that go unreported cannot be 
addressed and behavior that is exemplary cannot be rewarded. 
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Inflection Point 2: Disciplining 
 When poor teacher behavior is reported to the district education office, the ability to 
quickly discipline the teacher and correct the behavior is a crucial accountability mechanism for 
reinforcing better service delivery outputs. Disciplinary powers are still decentralizing to districts 
in Malawi; however, significant progress on decentralizing these powers has been made since 
2018. A central government respondent describing how the power to discipline should appear in 
districts said the following about these relatively new developments: 
“…we have a better direction because discipline of teachers can be done quickly at the 
local council. At local council they have what we call Appointments and Disciplinary 
Committees, ADCs, that are supposed to look into disciplinary issues of their staff from 
Grade L and below they can even make a determination of whether they want him to be 
dismissed or interdicted. The Local Authority Service Commission, LASCOM, would just 
have to verify it. But from Grade K and above, they also can still make a 
recommendation, and then they have to take it to Local Authority Service Commission to 
make a determination on that, and it’s now a bit faster than it used to be when it was here 
and the [Teacher] Service Commission, which was a heavy job to do it for the whole 
country. So that too was another area where things are quite improving.” (Central 
Government Respondent) 
 This respondent from the central government describes a more efficient system under 
which district officials can discipline primary education teachers at a certain employment grade. 
Regardless of employment grade, this description of the new disciplinary system seems to 
suggest districts possess greater disciplinary power. Interviews with central government officials 
in the Ministry of Education and at other offices supported this impression.  
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 Among district education respondents, there was a strong sense that disciplinary powers 
were shifting; however, perception around the degree of that shift varied widely from participant 
to participant. Fifty-four percent of participants (7/13) described moderate disciplinary decision 
space, giving no indication that they needed any approval from the central government before 
finalizing disciplinary decisions for certain teachers. On the other hand, thirty-one percent of 
participants (4/13) perceived narrow disciplinary decision space, meaning they did not see any 
ability to independently discipline teachers at the district level (see Table 4). The survey results 
were equally diverse. Forty-six percent of participants (6/13) either agreed or strongly agreed 
with the statement “My office has sufficient ability to discipline primary school teachers” while 
two out of fourteen participants disagreed with the statement and five were neutral.  
Table 4: District Education Respondents’ Perception of decision space at Inflection Point 2 
- Disciplining 
 Disciplining decision space Sufficient Disciplinary Power? 
DE Participant 1 Narrow Disagree 
DE Participant 2 Moderate Strongly Agree 
DE Participant 3 Narrow Disagree 
DE Participant 4 Narrow Agree 
DE Participant 5 Moderate Neutral 
DE Participant 6 Moderate Neutral 
DE Participant 7 Wide Agree 
DE Participant 8 Moderate Neutral 
DE Participant 9 Moderate Agree 
DE Participant 10 Moderate Neutral 
DE Participant 11 Narrow Agree 
DE Participant 12 Moderate Strongly Agree 
DE Participant 13 - Neutral 
 
 In interviews, district respondents also gave varied impressions of the types of 
disciplinary powers that they had at their disposal. One participant described an ability to 
interdict a teacher during an investigation while another lamented that the ability to interdict had 
recently been stripped from his office. Other participants expressed that they had the ability to 
send verbal and written warnings but could not discipline further without central government 
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approval. There are numerous reasons why district education respondents may have provided 
such differing responses to perceptions of disciplinary power. The decentralization of 
disciplinary powers was relatively new at the time of these interviews. As such, ADCs in some 
districts could still have been developing, which may have required these districts to send their 
cases to the central government for resolution. Another possible explanation for these diverse 
results is that there were no norms or legal frameworks for what disciplinary action should look 
like in district governments. The diverse responses displayed here are in line with research that 
has found the decentralization process to vary among local governments (see: Liu et al., 2006). 
As disciplinary powers at the district level become more solidified, their perception may become 
more aligned.   
 Despite participants’ differing views on disciplinary decision space at the time of the 
interview, there was still a feeling that district officials had inadequate power to discipline. Seven 
participants made links between lacking disciplinary powers and reduced ability to hold teachers 
accountable for their jobs. One respondent noted that he could remove a teacher from the 
classroom if the learning environment was unsafe; however, he had no power to remove the 
teacher from payroll:  
“So, in such you tell him…stop teaching, and he stops teaching. At the end of the month, 
he gets his full salary. The process is [ongoing] for one year. It means for twelve months, 
he’ll be getting full salary and he is not working. Now what does the others do? He goes 
out boasting: “…I’m not working and yet I’m getting full salary.” And these others, they 
are starting complaining. And now if someone is hard working he [feels] defeat: “I’m 
working for nothing. This one is not working and he is getting the full salary.” (District 
Education Respondent) 
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 While the immediate situation affecting the student may be resolved, the teacher also 
faces no financial punishment for his or her actions until the central government reviews the 
case, a process that may take months or years. Unable to immediately hold that teacher 
accountable, this respondent describes that other teachers may feel “defeat.” The implications of 
low morale may, at best, lead teachers to become less motivated in the classroom. At worst, it 
may indicate to other teachers that poor service delivery will go unpunished, reducing incentive 
to meet teaching standards in the classroom.  
 The effects of this limited ability have implications for the wider education system, with 
one participant describing the following: 
“…teaching is like a football game whereby students are sent in from one class to 
another. They are supposed to be handled by different teachers at different levels. So 
sometimes, teacher discipline also affects teaching and learning. And if the issues are not 
resolved quickly, our students are also affected, and when they are affected in terms of 
performance, then when they go to the next class, that other class is also affected. And … 
teacher discipline, especially...affects learner performance. Even the hard working 
teachers are also affected because at one point they still handle the students from that 
class.” (District Education Respondent) 
 Effective teaching requires that teachers be in the classroom and creating a productive 
space for learning. When teachers are not upholding this standard, disciplinary action is one way 
to hold them accountable for their jobs and correct their behavior; however, when district 
officials cannot quickly hold teachers accountable for acting inappropriately, the results for 
students as well as other teachers can be compounding.  
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 Despite some respondents wanting more disciplinary powers, two respondents expressed 
hesitancy at the idea, suggesting that this power might be abused. Those in support of gaining 
more power, however, noted that institutions for government accountability were strong enough 
to combat any issues that may arise from increased district power: 
“…I think they will be careful because we all know these days you cannot just discipline 
somebody wrongly. You go out and the court is right there. It is not very far. We are self-
contained. The court is right there. So if a teacher feels offended he just moves to the 
court…He can go to the Ombudsman’s office. He can move to ACB [Anti-Corruption 
Bureau] and say ‘I feel something happened here can you investigate?’ But what we say 
is for cases that are very clear, things would move very fast.” (District Education 
Respondent) 
 While there may be a fear that HRM decentralization will lead to the exploitation of 
disciplinary powers, this respondent demonstrates a belief that the accountability institutions in 
Malawi will catch and correct any abuse. Noting that it is something “we all” know, he perceives 
that this impression is widely held among district officials wielding new power. Critics of 
decentralization point to evidence that it will increase corruption and elite capture (see: Bardhan 
& Mookherjee, 2006; Véron et al., 2006); however, the growth of accountability institutions 
within a decentralized setting could decrease this possibility. Exploring the impact of these 
institutions within the context of a decentralizing system could be an interesting avenue for 
future research. 
Inflection Point 3: Dismissal 
 Where disciplinary action alone is not sufficient, district officials may wish to dismiss a 
teacher. In this case, dismissals are not simply the removal of a teacher from one school, but 
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rather, a removal from the wider public education system and the associated payroll. Thus, it is 
an immense power to wield. Participants often did not directly discuss this inflection point in 
interviews. While distinctly different from discipline, which covers a wide range of punishments, 
the power to dismiss was often considered an extension of disciplinary power. Thus, where 
disciplinary power is limited, the ability to dismiss is also likely to be. This trend holds true for 
the participant who noted wide decision space in both disciplining and dismissing as well as the 
two participants who reported narrow decision space for disciplining and dismissals. Four 
participants who reported moderate decision space in disciplining discussed those powers 
narrowing when it came to dismissals, demonstrating how powers may became more limited as 
they increased (see Table 5)  
Table 5: District Education Respondents’ Perception of decision space at Inflection Point 3 
– Dismissing 
 Dismiss decision space Sufficient Dismissing Power? 
DE Participant 1 - Strongly Disagree 
DE Participant 2 - Neutral 
DE Participant 3 Narrow Strongly Disagree 
DE Participant 4 - Disagree 
DE Participant 5 - Disagree 
DE Participant 6 - Strongly Disagree 
DE Participant 7 Wide Disagree 
DE Participant 8 Narrow Disagree 
DE Participant 9 Narrow Strongly Disagree 
DE Participant 10 Narrow Strongly Disagree 
DE Participant 11 Narrow Disagree 
DE Participant 12 Narrow Disagree 
DE Participant 13 - Disagree 
 
 While participants often gave few details on dismissals in interviews, the survey question 
addressing this inflection point showed a clear trend. Ninety-two percent of participants (12/13) 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement “My office has sufficient authority to dismiss 
primary school teachers.” These results support the assumption that the lack of discussion 
surrounding dismissal powers is likely a result of insufficient disciplinary powers.  
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 Disciplinary and dismissal powers both have repercussions for district officials’ ability to 
keep teachers in rural classrooms. If a teacher does not show up to the school they have been 
assigned, district education officials have little ability to act in ways that discourage this 
behavior. When describing his power to discipline and dismiss an absent teacher, one participant 
said the following: 
“… then you report that issue, nothing is happening, what do you expect? People during 
that say after all it could take two years so it’s not helping. But if the discipline powers 
were brought right down here, then there will be an issue, then we will report, the 
decision is passed, it will come back this one has been dismissed. People will say ‘ehhhh 
if you misbehave you can lose your job even tomorrow.’” (District Education 
Respondent) 
 Without the power to discipline and dismiss immediately, there is an inability to district 
education officials to hold teachers accountable for showing up to work. Increasing these powers 
at the district level has the ability to increase links of accountability between district education 
officials and teachers. This power is crucial for holding rural teachers accountable for doing their 
jobs.  
Inflection Point 4: Promoting 
 Where reports of teachers’ behavior are positive, district education officials may wish to 
reward them. One formal method for rewarding teachers is promotions; however, participants 
who discussed promotional powers in interviews (12/13) all described this decision space as 
narrow, meaning they could not decide that a teacher deserved a promotion and give it to him or 
her without central approval (see Table 6). In large part, this power may still belong to the 
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central government because promotions require financial investment. One participant noted the 
importance of this relationship saying that,  
“.. the government has got the purse to pay all the teachers in the country. From that 
angle that the government has got the purse, then it – how much is in that purse? Right 
now, what government does is to say, we needed to have so many at this grade so that 
they control their purse as well. So in this case, in the district what happens is that, when 
there are promotions or whatever, there is now an allocation to say ‘these have now 
risen, they are at this level, let us manage to pay them.’” (District Education Respondent) 
 Because the central government still holds substantial financial control, they have a 
significant amount of power over when promotions take place. Respondents, however, noted that 
new policies have developed which are supposed to involve them in the promotion process. 
Mechanisms for district involvement include performance appraisals, interviews, and 
assessments. While respondents described the development of these mechanisms as a good step 
forward, many felt these mechanisms were superficial and were unclear on how they factored 
into the promotion process in practice. 
Table 6: decision space at Inflection Point 4 – Promoting 
 Promotion decision space Sufficient Promotion Power?* 
DE Participant 1 Narrow - 
DE Participant 2 Narrow - 
DE Participant 3 Narrow - 
DE Participant 4 Narrow - 
DE Participant 5 Narrow - 
DE Participant 6 Narrow - 
DE Participant 7 Narrow - 
DE Participant 8 - - 
DE Participant 9 Narrow - 
DE Participant 10 Narrow - 
DE Participant 11 Narrow - 
DE Participant 12 Narrow -  
DE Participant 13 Narrow - 
*The survey did not probe about whether promotion powers were sufficient.  
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 This sentiment can best be exemplified by the expansive set of promotions that took place 
shortly before these interviews. President Peter Mutharika announced the promotion of 20,000 
teachers a month before the May 2019 Tripartite Election (Nyondo, 2019). Describing the 
process that took place, one respondent said the following: 
“What happened was now the post of those teachers were advertised and when they were 
advertised, they were supposed to go for interviews, but government made a decision that 
there should be a waiver. So, there was a cut point whereby those who have served long 
for one position, should be promoted. So, they realize that list and we vetted the list 
where what we did here was to establish that these teachers are in the system and these 
teachers are working and it is true that these teachers have served in this district for this 
particular years and just need promotion. So we did that, we instructed to go ahead in 
promoting the teachers.” (District Education Respondent) 
 Despite original intent to include district officials in the promotion process, the central 
government eventually disregarded district involvement in order to be expedient. As a result, 
promotions were determined based on the number of years a teacher had been employed rather 
than the quality of their teaching. While some pointed to political motivations for the 
promotions, respondents equally noted that they did not necessarily see this development as 
negative, with one participant noting the following: 
“Yeah those who were promoted were very happy because it means that they move from 
one level to the other. Then they lift the bar, when they say at the bar it means someone 
structures is fined up to six. So if you have served for six years at that grade, you are no 
longer getting increase so they are stuck at that Grade. So if he is promoted to next, it 
means he is going to see a higher salary. So that was okay. But those who were not, 
	 45 
because a lot of them were left out. Yeah a lot of them. So, they were frustrated and they 
came to the office to complain and we have resubmitted the list for them to look at it and 
assist this process.” (District Education Respondent) 
 Teachers in their districts had been stuck at the same pay grade for years, and many 
respondents felt that they deserved a promotion. Equally, however, teachers had been left off the 
list for promotions, which caused tension in the district. Expanding on this theme, another 
participant highlighted the issues plaguing this particular round of promotions: 
“…after the original list had some problems where certain people who were dead were 
promoted, certain people who resigned were promoted, certain people who were 
disciplined or dismissed were promoted. Now, they gave us the list again, and said “no 
can you cut this list and verify who should be what?” So we are just trying to clean the 
list and we have thirty names and it is at that point that we were advised to provide a list 
of names that were saved for a certain period, and were never considered for promotion. 
But the results have not yet come. We have not yet heard on that one, yes.” (District 
Education Respondent) 
 The list of promoted teachers sent to districts included teachers who had died or may 
have resigned as well as those who were disciplined or dismissed, demonstrating that teachers 
promoted by the central government will not always reinforce quality teaching. The list also left 
off many teachers who qualified for promotions based on length of service. District officials 
fielded some complaints about this issue and sent revised lists to the central government asking 
for approval for those left out in June. At the time of these interviews in July and August 2019, 
district education officials had not received approval from the central government to promote 
these qualifying teachers.  
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 The implications for promoting based on length of service without district input were also 
discussed outside this particular case. Some participants raised broader concerns about how these 
types of promotions affected accountability for quality of teaching, with one participant saying, 
“So the badness of that where they not competing, the chances are high you are 
promoting people who are lazy. Because a promotion has to go to those people who are 
deserving, who are hard workers on the ground, but the one that just passed by in...yeah 
we are happy ... but there are some…who are lazy, but we have no control because it 
came with that statement to say can you just prepare promotions for these people.” 
(District Education Respondent) 
 The issue with promoting based on length of service without district input is that teachers 
who have not been attending work or have been misbehaving in the classroom may be promoted 
anyways. As this respondent notes, in order for promotions to reinforce accountability they must 
go to teachers that deserve them; however, with narrow powers to promote, district officials are 
reduced to administrators and may be instructed to promote “lazy” teachers.    
 Despite narrow powers to promote, the district education office will be forced to answer 
when teachers ask why they were not promoted despite performing better than others. One 
participant described such a situation, saying: 
“And we have teachers who complain and say ‘look, I’ve been serving for so long, and 
they promoted Jim, and left me. Jim doesn’t come to class. He doesn’t attend classes. He 
is always drunk. How does he get promoted?’ Then it is difficult. It is difficult for us to 
answer. But if we had done the recommendations through the documentation and the way 
they do it on the ground, the way teachers perform on the ground. The challenges could 
	 47 
have been many more – say ‘no, here is the report. We know how you perform. You didn’t 
satisfy certain things that these people satisfied’.” (District Education Respondent) 
 When absent teachers are promoted while present teachers are not, the result can be 
demotivating. When teachers question this decision, it is district education officials not the 
central government, who must answer for this decision, and yet, their input was often not 
considered. If the district were given more input in promotions, they would both be able to 
improve motivation within the system and answer to teachers as to why they may not have been 
promoted. Decentralizing this power could enforce the legitimacy of the district education office, 
improving links of accountability and bettering serving delivery outputs.  
Looking Forward: Respondents’ Hopes for Decentralization’s Progress 
 Although many challenges were raised throughout interviews, respondents were quick to 
note that they did not see the decentralization process as ineffective or bad. Explaining this 
sentiment, one participant said the following: 
“Yeah decentralization is a process and as a process it’s not just going to take place 
within one or two years. It has to take some time, and I’m sure when decentralization 
started there were some phases that we were supposed to have. Little by little until we 
finally have come to this level. Alright? I should have said that as a process, and again as 
Malawi is embracing this, the Malawian way, we shouldn’t match it with any other 
country. So, I should have said that the way that the process is going on very, very well 
because there are some things that are done in a certain phase and we see that they are 
completed and then we come to another phase and then we come to another area, and 
little by little we are moving to full decentralization.” (District Education Respondent) 
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 While recognizing the decentralization process as slow, this respondent remained positive 
about the progress made thus far. In his view, reaching full decentralization will be an 
incremental process, but one worth striving towards. This theme of hope for the future of 
decentralization was prevalent throughout interviews. When district respondents were asked to 
look forward, many envisioned a system that would have fully devolved HRM powers to the 
district level. Relaying his hopes for a fully decentralized system, one participant said the 
following: 
“Manage policy, give us and we will implement, but some autonomy on the ways we do 
things with discipline and stuff, we should have those powers. The period of time, a 
report comes maybe, within two weeks we should be able to resolve. Say okay he did this 
offense, it means interdict immediately, okay? Or no, want to deduct the salary for this 
month? We do it right now. But at this time we cannot do it… So we are looking forward 
for that. Where powers they should be decentralized.” (District Education Respondent) 
 This respondent describes a picture of completed decentralization in which the central 
government sets policy goals, and district officials have the ability to implement those goals in 
ways that make the most sense for their constituency. With regards to HRM, this respondent 
envisions a system where district officials have a series of disciplinary tools at their disposal to 
correct poor service delivery.  
 These same types of visions of completed decentralization echoed throughout many 
respondents’ responses to this question, including those in the central government. Describing 
the HRM system, one central government participant said the following: 
“What we got to have in the future is that the district councils should be full empowered. 
By that I mean that in terms of human resource, we should have a state whereby the 
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district councils would be able to decide what kind of human resource they should have. 
What kind of jobs they should have, they should decide on that. In terms of remuneration, 
how do they remuneration, they should do that on their own. That’s the ideal situation 
that we are looking at …so it should have been the district councils or have the teachers 
who actually do the performance management there, they should decide who should be 
promoted. They should be deciding that. They shouldn’t be deciding that for them here at 
the central government.” (Central Government Respondent) 
 The perspective provided by this respondent aligns closely with the perspective provided 
by district respondents. He describes a future for decentralization where district governments 
have the power to conduct human resources in a way that best fits the need of their communities, 
including the ability to hire, assess performance, and promote. In this view of the future, the 
central government steps back from HRM powers and allows district governments to become 
fully empowered.  
 As discussed throughout this analysis, however, gaining district-level power at all 
moments in the HRM system will be difficult without the full decentralization of hiring. In two 
cases, respondents noted that they had worked in a district office where district-level advertising 
and recruiting was implemented for a number of years before being reversed. Describing how 
this system worked, one participant noted the following: 
“We had some program where teachers were being recruited through schools, through a 
zone and it worked. Because where there are no teachers it means they recruit teachers, 
those who have graduated, say, they would train. After training they would go back to 
their villages so that solved the problem of accommodation…	 Unfortunately, it was 
stopped. That was when we had a shortage of teachers…	 It solved the problem for three 
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years. They extended up to six years. It was a very good way. So I said, let’s go back to 
that. Recruitment should go back to that process.” (District Education Respondent) 
 This respondent described a system in which zones recruited teachers for training. Once 
trained, these teachers would return to teach in the zone that hired them. Often their home 
village, these teachers had accommodation, solving one barrier to maintaining teachers in rural 
classrooms. When the program stopped, shortages of teachers in rural villages became a serious 
issue for this district again. The two respondents who noted this type of program gave anecdotal 
evidence that the full decentralization of hiring powers could have massive benefits for service 
delivery outputs in the education sector. 
 The full decentralization of these powers, however, is likely to be a goal accomplished in 
the long-term, with respondents in the central government elaborating on barriers to 
decentralizing these powers. Two central government respondents raised the need to align the 
Local Government Act with discretionary policies in the education and health sector. Speaking to 
the conflict that misaligned policies cause, one participant said the following: 
“The registrations and the acts do not talk to each other...I will give you a typical 
example, the teaching service commission is the one mandated to recruit, discipline, and 
manage the teachers in general. That’s what the act, the Education Act, says. 
Decentralization comes in as a policy and says all the basic education to the council. You 
see what I mean? Now the council says ‘oh now these are ours.’ A teacher misbehaves, 
who disciplines him? And in the first place who recruited the teachers? The Teaching 
Service Commission. But now that they are transferred you are saying they belong to the 
council. So even if it was me, I would argue. Because the one who recruits you is the one 
who gives you conditions of service...In between, I am transferred to your colleague and 
	 51 
then I misbehave there…if he tries to discipline, I will say you are not my employer…so 
you can’t discipline me. If he tries, I can go to court and say, he doesn’t have any 
mandate because he is not my employer. He never recruited me. The legal 
documentations have not been harmonized.” (Central Government Respondent) 
 This respondent notes that the difficulty with decentralizing HRM powers is that there are 
conflicting legal mandates. This perspective suggests that formal decision space is still not 
comprehensively defined. Although the Local Government Act provides a definition of decision 
space wider than that currently granted to district officials, this respondent provides evidence that 
other pieces of legislation define narrower decision space. Aligning these documents with one 
another will be a crucial part of continuing to decentralize, and while I do not speak extensively 
to formal decision space in this thesis, it may be an interesting point for future study.   
 Another barrier to decentralizing HRM decision space is low resources. One central 
respondent noted that the next step in figuring out the HRM process was conducting a functional 
review, but the resources were not there: 
“The main topic is in terms of financial resources…we have always wished to go to the 
district councils, make an assessment of the district councils, come up with the relevant 
organization structure, the staffing levels, so that we can facilitate the decentralization 
process. But we haven’t been able to do that. Much as we have been seen on the ground. 
But it is largely because of financial resources.” (Central Government Respondent) 
 According to this participant, the next major phase in the decentralization of HRM 
powers involves a functional review. Yet, lacking financial resources have prevented them from 
carrying out this next step. This respondent noted later in the interview that the last functional 
review had been conducted in 2004. While he and his team had been asking for the funds for 
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years, they had yet to come. It is unclear exactly why these funds were unavailable, but his point 
demonstrates another dimension to consider when thinking about barriers to devolving decision 
space. There simply may not be the resources available to take the next necessary step.  
 While these barriers may render HRM powers slow to decentralize, there may be some 
other alternatives that could legitimize the district government and help improve service delivery 
in the short-term. For example, one respondent noted that some schools were using funds 
delegated to them by the central government to hire assistant teachers: 
“Each school is forced to [spend the] little amount that they are given every year, 
600,000 kwacha. They must recruit an assistant teacher, maybe pay him as little as 
twenty thousand kwacha every month…The school governing bodies at school level will 
decide what they think these critical what they should spend that money on. And one of 
those critical areas is that of shortage of staff. So they would be first to hire a teacher 
with that money.” (District Education Respondent)  
 This respondent depicts a system in which schools hire their own assistant teachers with a 
school-level funding mechanism that already exists. While the respondent expresses some 
displeasure with the fact that school improvement funds are being spent on additional teachers, 
local hiring of assistant teachers does decentralize the HRM system to individual schools, 
allowing for disciplinary action to be taken swiftly at the school level. Increasing the amount of 
money in school improvement funds would not require the same type of functional review 
required to add more permanent teaching positions, but could be equally impactful in getting 
more teachers in the rural classrooms that need them most.  
 One district education respondent also noted an innovative way of improving motivation 
that would exist outside of the decentralization of HRM powers. For example, one respondent 
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mentioned an alternate rewards system that he was trying to set up to encourage good service 
delivery: 
“So this, this year, what we want to do is pick out our best teachers… our best 
performing schools, and maybe get to one central place where we can have a ceremony 
and give the maybe a certificate of recognition, a gift for, and some allowing give them 
some gifts. It could be some cash gifts if we could find some cash. And others, just to 
encourage them, to say thank you, you’ve done wonderful work, this is the way to go. So 
others can maybe learn.” (District Education Participant) 
 While not a large enough intervention to detract from the need to continue decentralizing 
HRM powers, such a ceremony could serve as a bridge to reaching better service delivery by 
motivating teachers in the classroom. At the time of this interview, however, this respondent still 
did not have funds to organize this ceremony. These types of interventions could be an 
interesting point of entry for donors and non-governmental organizations invested in supporting 
local initiatives in the education sector. 
 Although respondents often expressed positivity about the future, they equally admitted 
that the path to achieving decentralization has been and will likely continue to be a long and 
often frustrating process. While they hoped to see the full decentralization of HRM powers, 
many recognized that the reality of achieving that was years away. Supporting a patchwork of 
local innovations and ideas is one way to improve service delivery in the short-term while not 




V. Recommendations and Conclusion 
  Throughout this thesis, I provide evidence that the transition of HRM powers from the 
central government to district governments is ongoing within the education sector in Malawi. 
Respondents largely perceived decision space around the power to hire, dismiss, and promote 
teachers to be narrow, while there is evidence that decision space around the power to discipline 
is growing. The generally limited ability to act without central approval has diminished the 
legitimacy of the district office, restricted the ability for district officials to hold teachers 
accountable for their actions, and decreased teacher motivation, ultimately affecting service 
delivery outputs. In the future, district education and central government respondents hope to see 
a system in which HRM powers are fully decentralized. District education respondents note that 
they will be able to correct unhelpful teaching behavior immediately and set better standards for 
the quality of teaching when the full transition of powers occurs.  
 This thesis aimed to project the experiences of district government officials into the 
discourse surrounding decentralization. The qualitative design allowed for the exploration of the 
challenges that accompany managing staff without adequate powers. While the sample size for 
this study is not unusual for qualitative studies, it does limit the representativeness and 
generalizability of the results. These findings should not be assumed to be the experience of all 
district education or central government officials, nor should they be assumed to represent 
officials from a certain district. Future studies could be structured with this goal in mind, 
randomizing district selection and interviewing more than one person from each office in order 
to understand how district resource availability and varying demand intersect with limited HRM 
power.  
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 The survey administered as a part of this thesis was limited by a lack of pre-testing and a 
failure to translate into the local language, Chichewa. While I note that the survey sometimes 
yielded different results from the interviews, it is unclear if that occurred because of a 
methodological shortcoming or if it represents a trend that should be explored more. Because the 
many studies on this topic area rely on Likert Scale surveys to measure perceptions of power, it 
could be interesting to explore whether these surveys capture a different picture from in-depth 
interviews. Future research might also explore the question of sufficient power at the district 
level, as the survey probed on this topic but did not get a clear answer.   
 Despite the limitations of this study, the results have implications for policymakers and 
academics alike. In the long-term, the continued decentralization of powers to district 
governments, particularly in the power to hire, was perceived by respondents to be an effective 
policy goal; however, central government respondents brought up several barriers to achieving 
this goal, including lack of legislative cohesion and limited resources. Exploring these barriers 
and possibilities for overcoming them could be both an academically interesting contribution as 
well as useful for policymakers.  
 In the short-term, there are some policy interventions that may help motivate teachers 
while not detracting from the need to decentralize HRM powers. These interventions, as 
discussed by respondents, include appreciation ceremonies and expanding school budgets for the 
hiring of assistant teachers. Initiatives like these could be an interesting entry point for 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) hoping to support the education sector through local 
initiatives. While NGO intervention was briefly discussed in interviews with relevance to 
decentralization policy, a further point of study could address how donor organizations and 
NGOs navigate the decentralized system.  
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 The results of this thesis also add to the growing body of literature that views 
decentralization as a process, rather than a dichotomous policy mechanism. Similar to Liwang 
and Wyss (2018) and Pierantoni and Regina (2011), I find evidence that it may take decades for 
decentralization reforms to integrate into a previously centralized system. While much of the 
academic conversation has attempted to assess whether decentralization is delivering the 
theorized outcomes, the implicit assumption of these studies is that legislative decentralization 
alone can affect service delivery. As my findings demonstrate, it is the granted informal decision 
space that will impact whether or not these results are achieved. This study provides further 
evidence that dichotomous assessments of decentralization’s effects are not useful without 
contextualizing the powers that have actually been decentralized. For scholars who wish to study 
decentralization’s effects, I suggest providing a comprehensive analysis of informal decision 
space before analyzing this policy’s success.  
 The contestation of power that underlies decentralization will always make it complex to 
study. As power shifts back and forth between central and local government, however, studying 
this complexity becomes necessary for understanding why it may be yielding successful or 
unsuccessful service delivery outcomes. As demonstrated by this thesis, emphasizing the 
nuances of decentralization policy has the potential to bring the experiences and challenges of 
those navigating this system to the forefront of the discussion. Ultimately, gaining understanding 
of that perspective is necessary in creating policy capable of tackling the complexity 
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VII. Appendix 1: District Respondent Interview Protocol 
 
Decentralization Interview Guide – District Government Workers 
 
1. What is your role? How long have you worked here? 
2. Could you describe the decentralization process as you have seen it occur during your 
time in government? 
3. When did decentralization begin impacting/changing your work? How did your work or 
responsibilities change because of decentralization policies? 
4. How did these new roles and responsibilities impact your job? 
5. How did you adjust to your new responsibilities? 
6. How did these policies change your ability to deliver services? (Probe on both service 
delivery to other civil servants and non-government citizens) 
7. Which services do you struggle most to deliver? 
8. How has decentralization changed your relationship with civil servants (reference 
teachers, health workers, or other relevant example depending on ministry)? 
9. What do you see as the primary barriers to successful decentralization in Malawi? Do you 
think the barriers are the same for all ministries, or do they differ by ministry? (And if the 
latter, how do they vary?) 
10. Do you think financial resources or human resources are more of a barrier to successful 
decentralization, and why do you think that? 
11. What challenges have arisen due to decentralization policies? (Probe on specific policies 
mentioned if necessary) 
12. What benefits have arisen because of decentralization policies? (Probe on specific 
policies mentioned if necessary) 
13. What does successful decentralization mean to you? 
14. Recently, thousands of civil servants in the government have been promoted to new 
levels. How did your office deal with these promotions? How is the process going? 
15. What kind of support would have made the decentralization transition better/easier? What 




VIII. Appendix 2: Central Respondent Interview Protocol 
 
Decentralization Interview Guide – Central Government Workers 
 
1. What is your role? How long have you worked here? 
2. Could you describe the decentralization process as you have seen it occur during your 
time in the government? 
3. When did decentralization begin impacting/changing your work? How did your work or 
responsibilities change because of decentralization policies? 
4. How did these new roles and responsibilities impact your job? 
5. How did you adjust to your new responsibilities? 
6. How has the decentralization process changed your ability to deliver services? (Probe on 
both service delivery to other civil servants and to non-government citizens) 
7. How has decentralization changed your relationship with district-level governments? 
8. Which services do you struggle most to deliver? 
9. What do you see as the primary barriers to successful decentralization in Malawi? Do you 
think the barriers are the same for all ministries, or do they differ by ministry? (And if the 
latter, how do they vary?) 
10. Do you think financial resources or human resources are more of a barrier to successful 
decentralization, and why do you think that? 
11. What challenges have arisen due to decentralization policies? (Probe on specific policies 
mentioned if necessary) 
12. What benefits have arisen because of decentralization policies? (Probe on specific 
policies mentioned if necessary) 
13. What does successful decentralization mean to you? 
14. What kind of support would have made the decentralization transition better/easier? What 




IX. Appendix 3: Likert Scale Survey 
	
Ministry: _____________________               Level (Circle One): Central or District 
Please mark the box that most closely 
matches how much you agree with the 
following statements.  
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. The service charter for my ministry is well 
defined.  
     
2. I can comfortably provide a majority of the 
services listed in my ministry’s service charter. 
     
3. I can comfortably provide a majority of the 
services listed in my ministry’s charter in the 
allocated time period. 
     
4. I feel comfortable holding a majority of my co-
workers accountable for their work. 
     
5. I feel comfortable holding a majority of my 
subordinates accountable for their work.  
     
6. I think most citizens feel comfortable lodging 
complaints with my office. 
     
7. I think most citizens feel comfortable 
discussing service issues with my office. 
     
8. My office has sufficient ability to discipline 
primary school teachers. 
     
9. My office has sufficient ability to discipline 
secondary school teachers. 
     
10.  My office has sufficient authority to dismiss 
primary school teachers. 
     
11.  My office has sufficient authority to dismiss 
secondary school teachers. 
     
12.   My office has sufficient authority to hire 
primary school teachers. 
     
13. My office has sufficient authority to hire 
secondary school teachers. 
     
14. My office can allocate the funds provided to 
us by donors however we see fit. 
     
15. My office can allocate the funds provided to 
us by the central government however we see fit.  
     
16. We have a good relationship with most 
district level personnel.  
     
17. I am proud of the quality of services that we 
deliver. 
     
